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Abstract We propose and demonstrate a set of microservice-based security components able to
perform physical layer security assessment and mitigation in optical networks. Results illustrate the
scalability of the attack detection mechanism and the agility in mitigating attacks.
Introduction
Scalability of Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
controllers has always been a concern. Tradition-
ally, (optical) SDN controllers are developed as
a software monolith, i.e., a single software en-
tity deployed and scaled as a whole[1],[2]. How-
ever, network growth in terms of the number
of devices and services to monitor and control
poses important challenges related to, among
other, synchronization between multiple controller
instances and their efficient scaling with the num-
ber of tasks to perform.
While most of the (optical) SDN controller oper-
ations relate to the set-up, reconfiguration, and/or
tear down of a Connectivity Service (CS), there
are other complex tasks that require continuous
monitoring of all running CSs. An example are
physical layer security assessment and mitigation
procedures, where the SDN controller processes
the Optical Performance Monitoring (OPM) data
collected periodically from the optical devices,
and, in case an attack is detected, the affected
CSs are torn down or reconfigured, depending
on the mitigation procedure. With the increas-
ing number of CSs running in a network, efficient
scaling of such operations is imperative.
In this work, we propose and demonstrate a set
of microservice-based components that perform
physical layer security assessment and mitigation
operations in an optical transport network infras-
tructure. With this purpose in mind, we devel-
oped three components able to perform attack in-
ference, detection, and mitigation, and integrated
them into uABNO[3], a microservice-based optical
SDN controller. We tested the scalability perfor-
mance of these Physical Layer Security Compo-
nents (PLSCs) by measuring their response time
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under different network load conditions. Results
show that the proposed microservice-based im-
plementation approach takes only 2 seconds from
attack detection to mitigation, and can scale from
10 to 100,000 CSs without any noticeable impact
on the attack detection response time.
The uABNO Architecture
Compared to a monolith, microservice architec-
ture brings forth several advantages such as ease
of including new functionalities and possibility to
efficiently scale independent components. These
benefits propelled microservices as the de-facto
architecture currently used by the industry to de-
velop the so-called cloud-native applications.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of uABNO[3] that
implements a cloud-native optical SDN controller.
uABNO exposes network topology and CS to ex-
ternal applications (e.g., Operations Support Sys-
tems/Business Support Systems - OSS/BSS). CS
requests are received through the North-Bound
Interface (NBI) microservice, which translates
Open Networking Foundation (ONF) Transport
API (TAPI) requests to internal protocol buffers
and forwards it to the connectivity microservice.
Path computation, context, among other compo-
nents, communicate through standardized proto-















Fig. 1: Architecture of the uABNO SDN controller including
the optical physical layer security components.
Fig. 2: Interactions among the PLSCs and the other uABNO components. The processes used for the creation of CSs are
simplified since they are not relevant for the use case under exam.
The uABNO controller in[3] did not have any
physical layer security management capabilities.
Here, we extend it by including an attack detector,
an attack inference, and attack mitigation compo-
nents (dark gray in Fig. 1) The attack inference
component contains a Machine Learning (ML)
model that performs Attack Detection and Iden-
tification (ADI) based on OPM data[4]. The attack
detector processes the output of the attack infer-
ence component to get the correct security as-
sessment for each CS in the network, and triggers
the attack mitigation component when an attack
is detected. The attack mitigation component is
responsible for counteracting the detected attack,
e.g., by re-routing a vulnerable CS[5], or by com-
puting and allocating a backup protection path[6].
Security Assessment and Mitigation
Fig. 2 details the interaction among the uABNO
components when performing security assess-
ment. During the creation/deletion of CSs, the
connectivity component notifies the attack detec-
tor about the change administered to a particular
CS. This enables the attack detector to maintain
a list of all the active CSs in the network.
Attack detection operations are periodically
performed by a detection loop shown in Fig. 2.
The attack detector obtains the latest OPM data
from the active transponders in the networks.
These data are then sent to the attack inference
component for ADI purposes. This instance of
the attack inference component uses a super-
vised learning model that only needs the latest
optical performance data point. It would also be
possible to use an unsupervised learning model,
but in this case a sequence of OPM data (and
not only the latest points) might be necessary[4].
Since the three PLSCs are implemented sep-
arately they can also be scaled independently,
depending on their needs. For example, when
the number of CSs increases but no attacks are
detected, only the attack inference and detector
components need scaling, while the attack miti-
gation does not.
Once an attack is detected, the attack detec-
tor component informs the attack mitigation com-
ponent about the affected CSs and the attack ID
(i.e., the attack type). The attack mitigation com-
ponent is responsible for computing ways to cir-
cumvent the vulnerability of the CS. In this spe-
cific implementation the mitigation component im-
plements a simple yet efficient solution to coun-
teract power jamming attacks. It first tries to es-
tablish a new CS between the same source and
destination of the vulnerable CS.If a new CS is









• Create new CS
• Delete 
vulnerable CS
Fig. 3: Messages exchanged by the attack detector component. The attack detector has IP=10.244.0.97. The connectivity
component has IP=10.244.0.100, the attack inference has IP=10.100.49.86, and the attack mitigation has IP=10.244.0.237.
affected CS is torn down nonetheless.The attack
detector is notified about the creation of the new
CS and the deletion of CS affected by the attack.
Experimental results
To validate the effectiveness and the scalabil-
ity performance of the proposed PLSCs, we
use a uABNO deployment (managed by Kuber-
netes) over an emulated optical network. The
transponders’ data are collected from a real-world
testbed[4] representing (i) normal operating con-
ditions and (ii) two types of jamming attacks: in-
band and out-of-band jamming. The neural net-
work developed in[4] is used in the attack infer-
ence component. The attack detection loop is ex-
ecuted every 30 seconds.
Fig. 3 illustrates the communication between
the PLSCs and the connectivity component. In
the first part, the connectivity component notifies
the attack detector about the creation of two CSs
(at Time = 71 and 73 s). The attack detection loop
is triggered and the attack inference component
performs the ADI procedure for both CSs (Time =
81 s). In this case, no attack is detected and the
attack mitigation component is not called. Shortly
after, the CSs are deleted.
At Time = 119 s, a new CS is created. After
that, the attack detection loop is executed and an
attack is detected affecting the new CS. The at-
tack detector component notifies the attack mit-
igation component, which starts the process of
creating a new CS and deleting the vulnerable
one. Note that only 2 seconds are needed to per-
form the attack mitigation actions (i.e., they start
at 171 s and finish at 173 s). Obviously, this time
may vary depending on the reconfiguration time
of the devices involved.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the response time and
the number of replicas generated by Kubernetes
when the attack inference component needs to
monitor an increasing number of CSs at the same







































Fig. 4: Average response time and number of replicas of the
attack inference component.
has a minimal variation in the order of below one
millisecond when the number of CSs varies from
10 to 100,000. We also see that 1,000 CSs
shows the highest response time. This is be-
cause 1,000 CSs is not sufficient to trigger the
scaling. However, when the attack inference com-
ponent is replicated multiple times (i.e., for 10,000
and 100,000 CSs) the response time decreases
sharply to the level corresponding to 10 or 100
CSs. Although able to scale themselves too,
neither the attack detection nor the attack miti-
gation component scaled during this experiment.
This demonstrates one of the benefits of having
PLSCs implemented as separate microservices,
i.e., a component is scaled only if needed regard-
less of the scaling decision taken for the others.
Conclusions
In this paper we propose and demonstrate the
use of microservice-based PLSCs integrated with
uABNO. Results indicate that the solution can
trigger actions to mitigate power jamming attacks
in approximately 2 seconds. We also show that
by enabling replication, the solution can maintain
a stable response time even with large variations
in the number of monitored CSs.
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